Prior studies have found that, despite the intentions of the participants, objects automatically activate their semantic representations; however, this research examined only objects presented in isolation without a background context. The present set of experiments examined the automaticity issue for objects presented in isolation as well as in scenes. In Experiments 1 and 2, words were categorized more slowly when they were embedded inside incongruent objects (e.g., the word chair in a picture of a duck) than inside neutral nonobjects, suggesting that the meanings of the objects were activated despite participants' intentions. A new interference task was introduced in Experiment 3. When the same objects and words from the first 2 experiments were inserted into scenes in which those objects were probable or improbable, interference occurred from probable pictured objects but not from improbable pictured objects. Implications for theories of automaticity and models of object identification are discussed.
Automatic Semantic Activation of Objects
One way in which automaticity has been operationalized is in situations in which a stimulus that should be disregarded interferes with the participant's performance on a given task. For example, in the picture-word interference task, a word is embedded inside of a picture of an object (e.g., Glaser & Düngelhoff, 1984; Hentschel, 1973; Rosinski, Golinkoff, & Kukish, 1975; Smith & Magee, 1980) . In one version of this task, participants were instructed to ignore the object and name the category of the word.
1 Despite these instructions, word categorization suffered from the presence of an incongruent picture as compared with a congruent picture (Smith & Magee, 1980) . These findings were extended by Lupker and Katz (1982) with the inclusion of a nonobject (threedimensional looking figure that has no semantic referents) as a control. The results of experiments using the picture-word interference task suggest that regardless of the participants' goals, the to-be-ignored pictured objects automatically activated the objects' semantic representations.
Other researchers have examined the automatic access of the semantic information of objects with different paradigms. Using a masked semantic priming procedure, Dell'Acqua and Grainger (1999) found that picture primes facilitated the categorization of related word targets and the naming of related picture targets. When asked to directly categorize the briefly presented masked prime pictures, participants were at chance, which suggests that the priming obtained for the targets was unconscious. Because the picture primes were unconscious and strategies were not given enough time to operate, the facilitation effects found can be taken as evidence of the automatic recognition of the object's meaning (cf. Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 1975) .
Further evidence in support of the automaticity of an object's semantic activation was found with the negative priming task (Tipper, 1985 ; see also Tipper & Driver, 1988) . In this procedure, a prime trial consisted of the outlines of two objects overlapping each other, each presented in different colors. Participants were instructed to attend to one colored object and ignore the other. On the display that followed, participants named the probe item, which was either identical, semantically related, or unrelated to the ignored item on the prime trial. Participants were slower to name probe items that were identical or semantically related to the ignored prime items compared with the unrelated items, which suggests that the objects were processed semantically despite the participants' intentions.
Other studies have also suggested that even when the task requires only perceptual processing, evidence for semantic processing of objects can be demonstrated. For example, Boucart and colleagues (Boucart & Humphreys, 1992 , 1994 Boucart, Humphreys, & Lorenceau, 1995) presented participants with a reference object followed by both a matching target and a distractor. Participants were asked to decide which of the subsequent two objects matched the reference on size, orientation, direction of motion, surface texture, or spatial location of color information. Semantic relations among the referent object, target, and distractor were manipulated. The results indicated an effect of semantic information even though participants were focused solely on a perceptual level. Boucart and colleagues concluded that objects mandatorily activate their semantic representations if the global shape was attended. Dell'Acqua and Job (1998) similarly found evidence for automatic activation of an object's meaning when they had participants categorize the main axis of elongation of objects as vertical or horizontal. Objects that were elongated in a dimension opposite to their typical perspective were judged more slowly than were nonobjects.
Models of Object Identification
The research reviewed provides evidence in support for the claim that objects automatically activate their conceptual representations. When presented with a picture of an object, the meaning of the object seems to be activated, regardless of the task involved. Theorists have suggested that conceptual representations of an object can be accessed once that object has been identified. Several models have been proposed delineating the processes involved in object identification. Most of these have postulated that objects are recognized in a bottom-up fashion through perceptual analysis of components (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Bülthoff, Edelman, & Tarr, 1995; Marr, 1977 Marr, , 1982 Tversky & Hemenway, 1984) . In a recent review, Henderson and Hollingworth (1999) described three processes assumed to be involved in object identification. First, the surfaces and edges of the object are extracted from the retinal image (henceforth referred to as Stage 1). Second, these segmented areas are combined to form structural descriptions (Stage 2; cf. "geons" in Biederman, 1987) . Third, these structures are matched to the contents of long-term memory (Stage 3). Once a match is found, an object is identified. Upon identification, semantic information regarding that concept is now accessible. (Although it was not previously labeled, I refer to this semantic access as Stage 4.) According to Henderson and Hollingworth, the first two stages involve perceptual analysis, whereas the third stage is the link between perception (structural descriptions) and cognition (memory representations).
Most of these models of object identification, which depict only bottom-up processing, tend to focus on objects presented in isolation, without a background.
2 However, to understand the nature of identification and subsequent semantic activation of visually presented objects in humans, it is important to realize that in most instances objects are surrounded by natural real-world scenes. Many researchers studying objects within the context of a scene have suggested that object recognition is highly dependent on top-down information extracted from the scene as a whole and information retrieved from long-term memory about what is expected in that scene (Antes & Penland, 1981; Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992b; Friedman, 1979; Kosslyn, 1994; Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986) . Although they differ with respect to the exact nature of the contextual influence, in general these models suggest that information is quickly extracted from a scene, activating a prototypical schema or representation stored in longterm memory. This information is then used to generate expectancies about specific objects, which in turn facilitates individual object recognition. The locus of this top-down influence varies depending on the specific theory. The context may have an influence on the perceptual analysis of the components of the object (Stages 1 or 2 of or on the process of matching the results of the perceptual analysis with the memory representations (Stage 3; see , for a review of these models). This top-down influence need not take place serially; indeed both bottom-up and top-down processing may occur in a parallel manner.
Effects of Scene Context on Object Identification
One of the paradigms most commonly used to investigate the effects of scene context on object recognition is judging whether a target object appeared in a briefly presented scene (often labeled the target verification task, the object detection paradigm, or the brief presentation method; developed by Biederman, 1972) . In one version of the task, participants attempted to determine whether a target object was present in a scene that was flashed briefly (100 or 150 ms) on a tachistoscope (yes-no decision; Biederman, 1981; Biederman et al., 1982) . The scene was followed by a pattern mask that contained a spatial cue indicating the location where they should look for the target. When the target object was present, it was either in a normal position within the scene or it violated physical or semantic constraints of picture organization. Detection of the targets generally decreased as the number of violations increased. Semantic violations (e.g., a fire hydrant in a kitchen) were as disruptive as physical violations (e.g., a sofa floating in a living room). The results seem to indicate that an object's semantic relations are accessed within a single glance at a scene.
An interesting outcome of these experiments is that when violations occurred in a scene, participants were worse at detecting the targets. In particular, the poorer detection of the violation of probability (the object is unlikely to appear in the scene; e.g., a fire hydrant in a kitchen) suggests that participants are more likely to perceive expected or consistent objects than unexpected or inconsistent objects when allowed only a single glance at a scene. Other researchers using the object detection paradigm have also found that participants are better at detecting probable objects than improbable ones (Boyce, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1989; Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989) . Boyce et al. used this task to determine whether the context effects were due to the global scene meaning or the relationship among the objects within the scene. They manipulated the consistency of the target object both with the background as well as with other individual cohort objects. Their results indicate that global scene meaning, and not the compatibility of individual objects, is important for the facilitation of object recognition. These data indicate a top-down influence of the scene. Although it is unclear where the context effect occurs, Boyce et al. suggest that it occurs at the perceptual level.
However, several researchers have criticized the object detection paradigm (Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992a; De Graef, Christiaens, & d'Ydewalle, 1990; De Graef, De Troy, & d'Ydewalle, 1992; Henderson, 1992a Henderson, , 1992b Rayner & Pollatsek, 1992) . Participants may have used sophisticated guessing strategies. To make their decisions, it is possible that participants may have relied on their preexisting knowledge about where the prenamed object would be located or whether it would be probable within the scene, in combination with any information about general object size, line contours, and so forth, that they could extract from the scene. In fact, in a recent set of experiments by Hollingworth and Henderson (1998) there was no effect of semantic consistency when Biederman et al.'s (1982) original paradigm was modified to control for response bias. Thus, these results suggest that object identification is not influenced by scene context. Hollingworth and Henderson (1998) proposed that objects are identified in isolation from the top-down effects of the scene context. Instead, in their functional isolation model they suggest that any effects that the scene may have on performance (i.e., eye fixations, memory, accuracy) must occur after semantic information becomes accessible (Stage 4).
The Present Study's Paradigm: An Interference Task One characteristic of all object detection studies, including Hollingworth and Henderson's (1998) improved version, is that participants are encouraged to fully process objects to complete the task. This is also true of other paradigms used to test the effects of the scene on object recognition, such as eye movement and memory tasks (e.g., Antes & Penland, 1981; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Hock, Romanski, Galie, & Williams, 1978; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Pezdek, Whetstone, Reynolds, Askari, & Dougherty, 1989) . In all of these studies, participants were required to focus on the scene and to search for target objects. It is therefore difficult to determine whether semantic information was accessed automatically or through conscious efforts on the participants' part, possibly through some sort of response bias or guessing process. Although it should be noted that the automatic semantic activation of objects was not the original intent of these studies, examining whether access to the meaning of objects can be affected by scene context is an important issue.
On the other hand, studies that have examined objects without backgrounds have tended to use paradigms in which the semantic processing of the objects was irrelevant to the task (e.g., the picture-word interference task, negative priming task, and perceptual matching task described above). In all of these methods, semantic processing of the object actually works in opposition to performance on the particular task. Therefore, if an influence of semantics is found, this must be occurring despite a participant's intentions. Pitting automatic influences versus conscious strategies allows researchers to make more convincing statements regarding automaticity than if conscious and automatic components were working together (cf. Jacoby, 1991; Neely, 1977) .
Although studies have found that objects in isolation seem to activate their stored semantic representations mandatorily, none of them attempted to influence identification or semantic access by presenting the objects in real-world scenes. In fact, researchers have suggested that a background scene may not only facilitate objects that fit the context but may also inhibit objects that do not fit (Biederman et al., 1982) . If objects are always obligatorily processed for meaning, this should not be moderated by the scene context. Therefore, if semantic access can be reduced (or better yet, eliminated) in an opposition paradigm in which an object is presented in an inconsistent scene, then this would provide compelling evidence against obligatory semantic access of an object. Besner and Stolz (1999a, 1999b ; see also Bauer & Besner, 1997; Besner, 2001; Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 1997) have used this same logic to argue against the automatic semantic access of words. In all of their experiments, Stroop interference (Stroop, 1935) of a word was reduced or eliminated using attentional manipulations. These authors, in fact, say that the automatic semantic activation of words is a myth (e.g., Besner et al., 1997; Stolz & Besner, 1999 ; but see Neely & Kahan, 2001) . Further, if semantic access were prevented (i.e., Stage 4 was not reached), this would suggest that the scene context had an influence prior to Stage 4 (at Stages 1, 2, or 3), contrary to the functional isolation model.
The Present Experiments
The goal of the present set of experiments, therefore, was to determine whether the activation of an object's semantic representations could be modulated by using an interference paradigm. In a series of experiments this was tested using a revised version of Smith and Magee's (1980) categorization task. In Smith and Magee's study, interference was measured by subtracting the time to categorize a list of words alone from the time to categorize a list of combined incongruent pictures and words. In Smith and Magee's task, participants were instructed to say "yes" if the target items on a particular list were members of a particular category. In Experiment 1 of the present study, Smith and Magee's task was modified in two ways. First, similar to Lupker and Katz's (1982) study, a neutral condition was added to measure interference and facilitation directly for the incongruent and congruent objects, respectively. Second, instead of making vocal responses to a list of items presented on cards, participants pressed a key that corresponded to a category name on single-presentation congruent, incongruent, or neutral trials. In Experiment 2 congruent trials were removed to eliminate a possible participant strategy of paying attention to the object, because that strategy would succeed on some trials. In the first two experiments, objects and words were presented in isolation, with no background. In Experiment 3 the incongruent word-object pairs and neutral nonobject-word pairs appeared in scenes. The objects were either probable or improbable in the scene.
In addition to examining whether objects are automatically activated at a semantic level, a further minor aim of these studies was to test whether this could be tempered with practice. In all experiments the materials were counterbalanced in such a way that each word and object was presented only once in the first block. Across lists, target words appeared in every condition in the first block. This allowed examination of the effects of the first exposure to a stimulus. Further, within a list a particular participant would see all of the target words repeated across the blocks, once in each condition. Such a reduction in effects because of practice has been shown in the Stroop task (e.g., Effler, 1978; Ogura, 1980) ; however, the effects of practice have not been previously examined in the object-scene processing literature.
Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to replicate and extend the work of Smith and Magee (1980) , using a keypress task and including a neutral baseline condition. Participants categorized words that were printed inside objects or nonobjects. If the word was inside an object, the word was either the name of the object (congruent) or the name of an unrelated object from another category (incongruent). In the neutral condition, words were inside of nonobjects. Findings of interference and facilitation in this task would indicate that this paradigm is reliable with these materials and that the neutral nonobjects provide an adequate baseline for which to examine facilitation and interference effects. 4 
Method
Participants. Thirty-six participants from the University at Albany psychology participant pool received partial course credit toward an introductory psychology class. Participation was restricted to monolingual English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and no known reading disorders.
Materials and apparatus. Thirty-six objects and their corresponding names were used as stimuli. Nine objects-words were chosen equally from each of four categories: animal, clothing, food, and furniture. Five of the objects were taken from Henderson, Weeks, and Hollingworth (1996) . Objects were drawn by hand in black ink and scanned into a computer using HP DeskScan II software. In addition, 12 nonobjects were used. Four nonobjects were taken from De Graef et al.'s 1990 study, and 4 were taken from a later De Graef et al. study (1992) . I created the other 4 online. All stimuli were edited in Adobe Photoshop. The objects and nonobjects were displayed as grayscale contours on a white background at a total resolution of 800 ϫ 600 pixels. They were centered on the screen, subtending a visual angle of about 3.09°(range ϭ 1.43°-6.15°) at a viewing distance of 64 cm. The words were typed in the center of the object or nonobject in Arial 12-point font (mean visual angle ϭ 0.27°).
There were three conditions in this experiment based on the to-becategorized word: congruent, incongruent, or neutral. In the congruent condition the word appeared inside the object that it named (e.g., the word chair inside of a chair; see Figure 1a ). In the incongruent condition the word and the object were unrelated and were from two different categories (e.g., the word chair inside of a duck; see Figure 1b ). In the neutral condition, the word appeared inside of a nonobject (e.g., the word chair inside of a nonobject; see Figure 1c ). To ensure that the to-be-categorized words were not easier in one condition than another, it was important for every word to appear in every condition across participants. To accomplish this, words were rotated across conditions in three experimental lists. Further, the words were counterbalanced within participants across three experimental blocks to examine practice effects. Therefore, the data from each block were counterbalanced across participants and the data from an individual participant were counterbalanced across blocks.
Participants completed 108 trials, divided into the three blocks. Every block contained 36 trials: 12 congruent, 12 incongruent, and 12 neutral.
Within each of the three conditions there were three words from each category (animal, clothing, food, and furniture) per block. There were 24 objects and 12 nonobjects in each block. A particular object appeared in two of the three blocks, once with a congruent word and once with an incongruent word. In the other block the object was replaced by a neutral nonobject.
Stimuli were displayed on a Vivitron 1572 color monitor controlled by a Gateway 2000 Pentium PC-compatible microcomputer. Responses were collected by use of a keyboard. Programs were created on Micro Experimental Laboratory II software (Schneider, 1988) .
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three lists as they appeared for the experiment. A typical trial proceeded as follows. The word READY was presented in white 24-point Swiss, Helvetica (Swiss721 BlkEx BT) font on a black background in the center of the screen for 250 ms, followed by a 250-ms black screen. The black screen was replaced by the stimulus, which was a grayscale object and word on a white background. The stimulus remained on the screen for 10,000 ms or until the participant responded. The intertrial interval was a 4,000-ms black screen. 4 It is highly unlikely that all readers would agree on which stimuli are truly neutral in this or any task. Criticisms and arguments about the "best" neutral baseline has abounded in the Stroop as well as other research literatures (e.g., Jonides & Mack, 1984; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; MacLeod, 1991; Neely, 1991; Neely & Kahan, 2001) . It is possible that a particular participant might activate some semantic representations while viewing a particular nonobject, much as a person may "see" something familiar in a cloud. In this set of experiments, the nonobjects were considered neutral in that (a) there was no specific semantic referent that the nonobject would activate in all participants under all circumstances, if anything was activated at all, and (b) regardless, they were predicted to produce RTs that were faster than incongruent objects but were slower than congruent objects. Figure 1 . Example of stimuli used in Experiment 1.The word in each figure is chair. In (a) the word is embedded within a congruent object, a chair; in (b) the word is embedded within an incongruent object, a duck; and in (c) the word is embedded within a nonobject.
The participant was instructed to press the key corresponding to the category of the target word as quickly and as accurately as possible. The keys S (animal), C (food), M (furniture), and L (clothing) were labeled with the category name. Participants were instructed to ignore the object or nonobject. Trials were presented in a fixed random order with the only constraint being that consecutive responses were not from the same category. Within each block there were an equal number of responses from each category across the three conditions.
For the participants to become accustomed to the response-key mapping, several practice blocks were included. In the first block, the participant was shown the words animal, clothing, food, or furniture randomly 10 times each and had to press the key corresponding to the word. In the next practice block participants categorized 16 words into the four categories. These words appeared alone without an object present. In the final practice block participants categorized 12 words that appeared inside of objects or nonobjects. In all practice blocks there was an equal number of responses from the four categories. In addition, in this last block there was an equal number of each category response from the congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions. None of the words, objects, or nonobjects appearing in the practice blocks were found in the experimental trials. During the practice blocks only a tone sounded for 500 ms if the participant pressed the wrong key. Participants were told that there would not be a tone during the experimental trials but that speed and accuracy were both still important.
Results and Discussion
Only reaction times (RTs) for trials with correct responses were analyzed. To minimize the effects of outliers, a cutoff point of 2.5 standard deviations above and below each participant's overall mean was calculated. Any RTs above or below these cutoff points were replaced with the values at the corresponding cutoff points. Errors were analyzed separately. In all of the experiments the effects of practice on interference were examined by conducting analyses with block as a within-subject variable. However, the number of times a person had seen a particular word or object (or scene in Experiment 3) had no influence on interference; therefore, data were collapsed across block in this and subsequent experiments. All findings in this article were significant at a .05 alpha level, unless otherwise noted. Table 1 includes the mean RTs and errors for the three conditions in Experiment 1. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three levels (congruent, incongruent, neutral) was significant, F(2, 70) ϭ 37.28, MSE ϭ 3,227. To assess facilitation and interference, Dunnett's (1955) t tests were conducted on the means using the neutral condition as the control. (The Dunnett procedure involves comparing all treatment means with a single control and can be used for repeated measures as well as independent groups designs; see Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991 .) Reliable differences were found for both the neutral and congruent conditions, t(70) ϭ 3.39, and the neutral and incongruent conditions, t(70) ϭ 5.18. RTs to categorize words embedded in congruent objects were faster than in neutral nonobjects, whereas RTs to categorize words in incongruent objects were slower than neutrals. The same ANOVA was performed on the error rates, but it yielded no significant effects.
As predicted, the congruent condition RTs were significantly faster than the neutral condition RTs (45 ms of facilitation) and the incongruent condition RTs were significantly slower than the neutral condition RTs (70 ms of interference). These findings replicate the work of Smith and Magee (1980) and extend it to a keypress task. In addition, this pattern of results verifies that the nonobjects in this experiment were neutral in that they were a reliable baseline for this experiment (see Footnote 4), and the low error rates show that the words and objects were viable examples of the four categories. These results provide an affirmative answer to the question of whether objects seem to automatically activate their meanings, despite a person's intention to ignore them. The same pattern of results appeared after the first exposure to the stimulus in the first block as after multiple exposures in all of the blocks.
Although the participants were instructed to ignore the objects, it is possible that the presence of the congruent items led them to focus on the objects, as this strategy would help them make the correct response on a third of the trials (cf. Lowe & Mitterer, 1982; Zajano & Gorman, 1986 , in the Stroop task). Therefore, the remaining experiments included only the incongruent and neutral conditions. Experiment 2 attempted to replicate the interference effect found in Experiment 1 when the congruent trials were removed. In Experiment 3, scenes were added to test the effects of context on the interference.
Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was twofold. First, a goal was to replicate the first experiment without congruent items. Because the congruent items were removed, focusing on the objects could only hinder performance and thus this strategy would no longer be useful. As a result, any interference found for words presented in incongruent objects would be despite the intentions of the participants. This would be the first time that automatic activation of an object's semantic representations would be convincingly demonstrated with the picture-word interference paradigm. To my knowledge, previous experiments using the word-categorization version of the task involved congruent as well as incongruent trials. Second, an additional goal was to provide a baseline for use in Experiment 3. The incongruent trials of Experiment 2 were coded as "probable" baseline or "improbable" baseline, on the basis of the type of scene in which they would appear in Experiment 3. Because a scene context was not present in Experiment 2, it was predicted that there would be no differences between these stimuli. However, it was anticipated that RTs to both types of items would be slower than RTs to neutral trials. 
Method
Participants. Fifty-one students participated in Experiment 2. All participants were from the same population as in Experiment 1, although none had participated in that experiment.
Materials and apparatus. The same 36 objects/words and 12 nonobjects from Experiment 1 appeared in this experiment. Only incongruent and neutral trials were used. The only stimuli in this experiment were words, objects, and nonobjects.
As in Experiment 1, three lists were created to counterbalance the to-be-categorized words across three conditions. The three conditions were "probable" baseline, "improbable" baseline, and neutral. Further, these to-be-categorized words were counterbalanced across blocks for every individual as was done in Experiment 1. The word in both the "probable"-baseline and "improbable"-baseline conditions was always incongruent with the object. A particular object appeared once in the "probable"-baseline condition with a particular word (e.g., the word pants in a deer) and once in the "improbable"-baseline condition with a different word (e.g., the word pasta in a deer). The only difference between these two stimuli was the type of scene in which the object-word pairing would appear in Experiment 3. In the "probable"-baseline condition the objectword pairing was likely or expected to appear within the context of the scene in Experiment 3 (e.g., the word pants in a deer would appear in a forest scene) and in the "improbable"-baseline condition the object-word pairing was highly unlikely or unexpected to appear within the context of the scene in Experiment 3 (e.g., the word pasta in a deer would appear in a bedroom scene). Again, there was no scene background in Experiment 2. Object-word pairs were all incongruent; they were only divided into the two baseline conditions for a direct comparison to Experiment 3. There was an equal number of words from the four categories across the three conditions within and across blocks. Thus, each block contained 24 incongruent trials (12 that would appear in a probable scene and 12 in an improbable scene in Experiment 3) and 12 neutral trials. Within each of the three conditions there were three words from each category for each block. All other aspects of the materials and apparatus were identical to Experiment 1.
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that for Experiment 1, except that the congruent trials in the last section of the practice were replaced with incongruent trials.
Results and Discussion
Results were analyzed in the same manner as in Experiment 1. Three participants with an overall error rate greater than 20% were replaced with an additional three participants.
The one-way ANOVA ("probable" baseline, "improbable" baseline, neutral) indicated a significant difference between the three conditions, F(2, 100) ϭ 3.91, MSE ϭ 4,363. Tukey's (1953) honestly significant difference (HSD) test was used to examine all pairwise comparisons in this (and the next) experiment. 5 As shown in Table 2 , RTs to categorize words embedded in both types of incongruent objects were slower than RTs to categorize words embedded in neutral nonobjects. The 3-ms difference between the "probable"-baseline and "improbable"-baseline RTs did not approach significance (HSD ϭ 31). There were no significant differences between the error rates of the three conditions.
As predicted, RTs in the "probable"-baseline and "improbable"-baseline conditions were both reliably slower than they were in the neutral condition. Without the presence of scene context, the incongruent items in the "probable"-baseline and "improbable"-baseline conditions were essentially the same and thus, as expected, no differences were found between these items. These data seem to suggest that semantic activation of objects is automatic even when congruent items are removed. Thus, Smith and Magee's (1980) results have been extended to situations in which a strategy of focusing on the distractor object would never help in categorizing the word. Even so, participants could not prevent the meaning of the object from being activated, although this hurt their performance. The findings of Experiment 2 also lend support to other studies that have proposed that activation of an object's conceptual information cannot be prevented (Boucart & Humphreys, 1992 , 1994 Boucart et al., 1995; Dell' Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Dell' Acqua & Job, 1998; Tipper, 1985) .
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 demonstrated that objects presented in isolation mandatorily activate semantic representations. The purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine whether objects will continue to obligatorily access semantics when presented within a scene. Here, the objects previously labeled as "probable" baseline were inserted into scenes in which they would likely appear, and the items previously labeled as "improbable" baseline were inserted into scenes in which they would be unlikely to appear. (Probability was based on likelihood that the object would normally appear in a naturalistic scene, not on an intraexperimental manipulation.) Thus, the automaticity of semantic access for objects was tested using a combination of the object-detection method (Biederman et al., 1982) and the word-categorization method of Smith and Magee (1980) . If objects that are inconsistent with the scene background no longer cause interference for the words inside of them, then this would suggest that these objects are not automatically processed to a semantic level (but see the General Discussion for alternative explanations).
To prevent a biased influence of probable contexts over improbable ones (or vice versa) on task performance, two important constraints were made on the choice of materials. First, the same 5 Comparisons of both probable and improbable to the neutral are of interest to determine the amount of interference found for each of these conditions relative to the control. Further, to determine whether the interference found for each of these conditions differed from each other, the difference between the amount of interference for probable and improbable conditions was also of interest. This difference in interference is the same as the direct comparison of the probable and improbable RTs. Thus, all pairwise comparisons were of interest here and the Tukey's HSD is more appropriate than the Dunnett's t. scene was used with the same word across the probable, improbable, and neutral conditions. Thus, what varied across the three conditions was the particular interfering object in which the word was embedded, not the scenes or words themselves. Second, in addition to the word being incongruent with the meaning of the object, the meaning of the word was also incongruent with the scene itself. Thus, in all situations, the word used in the scene was always from a different category than the probable or improbable object and in addition was not related to the semantics of the scene. For example, in the farm scene the word duck was not used because the image associated with this word is probable in the farm scene. Instead the word cake was used in the farm scene as it is not associated with the farm, nor with the probable object, a pig, nor the improbable object, a table. Similar to the previous two experiments, the participants were instructed to ignore both the object and the scene and to categorize the word as quickly and accurately as possible. To help the participants with this, immediately before the scene was presented a fixation point was provided at the location of the word. The participants knew exactly where the word would appear and hence had no reason to pay attention to the context.
Method
Participants. Fifty-one students from the same participant pool as the previous experiments completed Experiment 3. None of the participants appeared in the first two experiments.
Materials and apparatus. To keep the object or nonobject word pairings identical in Experiments 2 and 3 (so that the only changes were the addition of the scenes in Experiment 3), the stimuli in both experiments were created in the same manner, as described in the Materials and apparatus section of Experiment 2. There were three conditions in this experiment: probable, improbable, and neutral. In the probable condition the object was likely to appear within the context of the scene (e.g., a dresser in a bedroom; see Figure 2a) , and in the improbable condition the object was highly unlikely to appear within the context of the scene (e.g., a deer in a bedroom; see Figure 2b ). In the neutral condition a neutral nonobject would appear within the scene (see Figure 2c ). These items had appeared without scenes in the "probable"-baseline, "improbable"-baseline, and neutral conditions, respectively, in Experiment 2.
Thirty-six scenes were used. Nineteen of these were modified versions taken from van Diepen and De Graef (1994) or Henderson et al. (1996) . The scenes subtended a visual angle of 21°wide ϫ 13°high at a viewing distance of 64 cm. All scenes were grayscale on white backgrounds at a resolution of 800 ϫ 600 pixels. Each scene was bordered by a rectangular box and centered on the screen so that the actual dimensions of each scene were 758 ϫ 488 pixels.
The 36 objects from Experiment 2 were paired with each scene so that the objects would fit in with the semantics of the particular scene (probable condition). The 36 objects and scenes were then re-paired to make the improbable conditions. The objects were swapped across scenes so that a pictured object that was probable in one scene would be improbable in another scene (see Figure 2 for an example).
6 Object-word pairings remained the same as in Experiment 2. A particular object appeared with one word in the probable condition and a different word in the improbable condition (see the Method section of Experiment 2). The to-be-categorized word was counterbalanced both across people (using three experimental lists) and across blocks, as was done in Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, a particular word was always used in the same scene across lists for every block and across blocks for every person, such that it appeared once with a probable object, once with an improbable object, and once with a nonobject (see Figure 2 ). All object manipulations were conducted digitally in Adobe Photoshop. In addition to being incongruent with the objects, all 6 The location of the objects within the scene was not manipulated. Objects appeared within all four quadrants of the scene as well as the center. Distance from the center was not a concern in this experiment because each word that was responded to appeared with an object from each of the three conditions at the same location in the same scene. This equates any effects due to location. Figure 2 . Example of stimuli used in Experiment 3. The scene in each figure is a bedroom and the word is pasta. In (a) the word is embedded within a probable object, a dresser; in (b) the word is embedded within an improbable object, a deer; and in (c) the word is embedded within a nonobject. In Experiment 2, the same words, objects, and nonobjects were used without the scenes. See text for details.
of the words to be categorized were also incongruent with the context of the scenes. None of the scenes contained any words as part of the background. All other aspects of the materials and apparatus were identical to Experiment 2.
Procedure. The 12 practice trials in which the word appeared inside of an object or nonobject were reduced to 6 trials. An additional 6 practice trials were given in which the word appeared either inside an object that was probable or improbable in a scene or inside a nonobject in a scene. On these practice trials, as well as the experimental trials, the participant was instructed to ignore the objects and scenes and to categorize the words as quickly and as accurately as possible. All other aspects of the procedure were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, except that the READY screen was replaced by a white asterisk on a black background. The asterisk appeared on the screen in the exact location of the first letter of the word to be categorized. Participants were told to fixate on the asterisk because it would always point them directly to the word to which they had to respond. Thus the participants were focusing on the asterisk when it was replaced by the word. This eliminated any need for the participants to search the scene to find the word; they were already fixated on it. As in the previous experiments, participants were instructed to ignore the scenes and objects and to respond quickly and accurately.
Results and Discussion
Results were analyzed in the same manner as in Experiment 2. Table 3 lists the mean RTs and errors for the probable, improbable, and neutral conditions in Experiment 3. None of the effects for errors were significant.
The one-way ANOVA indicated a significant difference among the mean RTs of the probable, improbable, and neutral conditions, F(2, 100) ϭ 10.71, MSE ϭ 3,551. As shown in Table 3 , a reliable interference effect was found between neutral and probable RTs; however, there was no significant difference between the neutral and improbable RTs. The difference between the probable and improbable conditions was significant (HSD ϭ 28).
The interference that was found for incongruent objects without a scene present was eliminated when those same objects and words were inserted into scenes in which the objects were inconsistent.
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The interference in the probable context condition remained significant. A 2 ϫ 3 interaction of Experiment ϫ Condition supported this assertion, F(2, 200) ϭ 3.30, MSE ϭ 3,957. Even though participants were instructed to ignore the scenes as well as the objects, whether the object fit with the background affected wordcategorization performance.
One potential criticism of these findings is that perhaps semantic activation is short-lived, and thus given the rather long RTs it is possible that the conceptual information was, but is no longer, activated for the improbable objects. Interference may not have been obtained because the object's semantic activation decayed prior to the word-categorization response. However, there is evidence that pictures remain semantically active even after long RTs in this experiment. Categorization of words inside probable objects is significantly slowed compared with neutral as well as improbable conditions. Thus even with the long RTs, there is evidence of semantic processing of objects. Clearly an explanation based on time alone cannot explain the difference between these two conditions. Further, the RTs in Experiment 2 without a scene (mean RT ϭ 1,251 ms) are actually very similar-numerically slower in fact-to the RTs in Experiment 3 with a scene (mean RT ϭ 1,236 ms).
General Discussion
Using a new interference paradigm, I examined the automaticity of semantic activation of objects in three experiments. In Experiment 1, facilitation and interference were found in a wordcategorization task when the word appeared inside a congruent or incongruent object, respectively. This result replicates the work of Smith and Magee (1980) and extends it to a keypress task. Interference was also exhibited in the data of Experiment 2 when the congruent trials were removed. These findings suggest that the semantic activation of objects in isolation is automatic, replicating findings from other paradigms (Boucart & Humphreys, 1992 , 1994 Boucart et al., 1995; Dell'Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Dell'Acqua & Job, 1998; Tipper, 1985) . In Experiment 3 the same incongruent objects were located within scenes in which the object was consistent (probable) or inconsistent (improbable) with the scene. The data demonstrated an elimination of interference for the improbable items. There are at least three potential explanations for these findings, each of which has implications for theories of automaticity as well as models of object identification: (a) the blocking hypothesis, (b) the slowing hypothesis, and (c) the inhibiting hypothesis.
Scene Context Blocks Semantic Activation of Improbable Objects
One explanation for the findings of Experiment 3 is that semantic processing of objects can be prevented or blocked. It is possible that the activation of the scene context blocked out the meaning of the improbable objects. Research has suggested that the scene meaning (schema) is automatically and quickly activated. Schyns and Oliva (1994; see also Oliva & Schyns, 1997) found that participants were able to identify a particular scene type on the basis of short masked presentations (e.g., 45-135 ms), even when individual objects were degraded beyond recognition. Perhaps this early activated schema blocked the improbable objects from ever 7 Although the 9-ms interference effect for the improbable condition was not significant, one could argue that the "true effect" was not eliminated, but was significantly reduced (to a 9-ms difference). Also, this reduction depends on the acceptance of the nonobjects as truly neutral. Regardless, the interference for the improbable condition was clearly reduced compared with the probable condition in Experiment 3 and the baseline condition of Experiment 2. Most automaticity accounts would predict neither an elimination nor a reduction in interference effects. reaching Stage 4, semantic access. Exactly how this was done is not clear at this point and should be examined by future research. One hypothesis that can account for the data is that some sort of gating mechanism was occurring (cf. Stolz & Besner, 1996; Visser, Zuvic, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999) . When a person views a picture of a scene, perhaps the activation of the schema closes several "gates" to the activation of objects that are not expected to appear in that context. Otherwise, everything that does fit the context (i.e., probable objects) cannot be prevented from entering through the gate. The conclusion that objects do not necessarily have to be processed to completion runs counter to the general finding from opposition paradigms, in which semantic processing of pictured objects in isolation was evident (e.g. Boucart & Humphreys, 1992 , 1994 Boucart et al., 1995; Dell'Acqua & Grainger, 1999; Dell'Acqua & Job, 1998; Tipper, 1985) . This explanation is analogous to those recently reported in the word-recognition literature, suggesting that words too are not ballistically processed for semantics, which is contrary to the prevalent view of word recognition. Besner and his colleagues (Bauer & Besner, 1997; Besner & Stolz, 1999a , 1999b Besner et al., 1997) have demonstrated that with certain manipulations of spatial attention, such as focusing the participants on one colored letter instead of on an entire word in color, the Stroop effect can be reduced or eliminated. Besner et al. (1997) stated that, "this outcome flies in the face of any automaticity account in which specified processes cannot be prevented from being set in motion" (p. 221). Besner and colleagues suggested that perhaps the default is to read the word, but because this default value can be manipulated, semantic activation for words is not truly automatic. The same logic can be applied here: With certain manipulations semantic activation for objects is prevented. Perhaps the default value for objects presented in isolation is semantic level activation, but because that can be eliminated by presenting objects in inconsistent scenes, this activation is not fully automatic.
Further, the blocking explanation suggests that the findings from Experiment 3 undermine the logic of the functional isolation model. If the scene prevents semantic activation from occurring, at least for objects that do not fit the context of the scene, it must be doing so either at the matching stage or earlier (Stages 1, 2, or 3). Therefore, because interference was eliminated, the object must not have activated its semantic representations; that is, token information was never successfully matched with the contents of long-term memory. The conclusion of the blocking hypothesis then is that, contrary to the claims of the functional isolation model, the scene has a top-down influence prior to Stage 4 and this influence is to block or gate objects that do not fit the scene context from being activated at a semantic level. It seems that the topdown processing from scene expectations interacts in parallel with the bottom-up processing of the individual objects, preventing full-blown semantic activation, although this assertion would need further testing.
Scene Context Slows Semantic Activation of Improbable Objects
The second potential explanation for the absence of interference for improbable objects in Experiment 3 is that the presence of the scene allows semantic information to become available at different rates from the probable and improbable pictures (see Besner, 2001 , for a similar slowing explanation for Stroop). Thus the improbable semantic information is not prevented from becoming available, but it is retrieved much more slowly. Semantic information from improbable objects (such as a deer in a bedroom) has not been fully retrieved, resulting in no significant interference to categorize words compared with words found in probable objects (a dresser in a bedroom).
Note that the slowing hypothesis is not problematic for some versions of automaticity. A strong automaticity account, such as that proposed by Besner and colleagues (Bauer & Besner, 1997; Besner & Stolz, 1999a , 1999b Besner et al., 1997) , would suggest that outside factors (e.g., the number of colored letters in word studies or the surrounding scene context in this article's object study) should not influence the automatic activation of semantic information; semantic activation should fully occur in all circumstances. However, numerous experiments have demonstrated that semantic activation can be facilitated by the presence of a related word or picture (e.g., semantic priming experiments for words and objects). Semantic priming is taken as evidence for (not against) automaticity, yet priming does influence semantic activation (it speeds it up). So why should slowing down activation be taken as evidence against semantic activation? A weak automaticity account, on the other hand, would suggest that as long as semantic access does occur the speed of this access is unimportant.
A slowing hypothesis, although not necessarily damaging to a weak automaticity account, does nevertheless pose problems for the functional isolation model. If retrieval of semantic information is slowed for improbable objects but not for probable objects, the scene context must have had an influence on this slowing process. Because no interference was obtained and thus semantics (Stage 4) had not been reached, this suggests that Stages 1, 2, or 3 were disrupted or slowed in a top-down fashion. Again, the top-down effects of the scene could be operating in parallel with the bottom-up object processing.
Scene Context Inhibits Semantic Activation of Improbable Objects
The third potential explanation for the findings of the last experiment is that the meanings of all of the objects were activated automatically, but then the scene schema actively inhibited semantics for items that did not fit that context (cf. Eimer, 1999) . This perhaps most parsimonious conclusion would prevent the apparent paradox that arises from the previous two hypotheses. The only difference between the alone and probable conditions (interference obtained) versus the improbable condition (no interference) was that the meaning of the object did not fit with the scene context. Thus, it seems logical that this improbability was detected (i.e., to know it does not fit you have to know what it is). This account (like the others) also relies on prior research that suggests that the global scene meaning is activated very early in processing (Oliva & Schyns, 1997; Schyns & Oliva, 1994) . Perhaps participants somehow were able to use the scene schema to actively inhibit the improbable object's meaning.
Note that this explanation does not pose problems for either theories of automaticity or the functional isolation model. In terms of automaticity, the inhibition hypothesis suggests that the semantic representations of the object were automatically accessed and once activated were squashed by the inconsistent scene context. In this view there is full semantic activation of the improbable objects but the scene context actively inhibits this activation, resulting in no net interference for the word-categorization task.
In addition to theories of automaticity, the inhibition hypothesis fits with the functional isolation model, which suggests that the effects of scene context are isolated from object identification processes. Objects are identified through the perceptual, matching, and ultimately semantic access stages before being inhibited. According to the functional isolation model, the scene context would not have an influence on object identification (Stages 1, 2, or 3) , although context effects may arise if later processing (Stage 4) tapped into semantics Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998) . If the inhibition hypothesis is correct, improbable objects were fully processed through Stage 4 (semantic activation) before being followed by inhibition. Thus, object identification is isolated from stored scene expectations.
The Interference Paradigm
Prior investigations have sought to establish whether scene context has an automatic influence on the identification and semantic activation of objects presented within that scene by using experimental paradigms such as the object detection, forced-choice discrimination, eye movement, and memory tasks (e.g., Antes & Penland, 1981; Biederman et al., 1982; Boyce et al., 1989; Friedman, 1979; Goodman, 1980; Hock et al., 1978; Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998 , 1999 Loftus & Mackworth, 1978; Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989; Pezdek et al., 1989) . In these facilitation paradigms it was necessary for the participants to focus on the objects, scenes, or both, to complete the task, and thus it is unclear whether the results obtained were due to strategic or automatic processing. The interference paradigm in this article has the advantage of putting these goals in opposition to each other instead of letting them work together. Because processing the objects to a semantic level in these experiments would hurt the goal of word categorization, any interference effects would be occurring despite the intentions of the participants. Unlike the facilitation paradigms, any results obtained here suggest automatic semantic activation. The finding that interference occurred when no scene was present as well as when the object was probable within the scene indicates that semantic activation is obligatory in these situations.
As delineated above, there are several explanations for why the improbable objects did not interfere with the word-categorization task. Besner and Stolz (1999a, 1999b ; see also Bauer & Besner, 1997; Besner et al., 1997) have suggested that elimination of interference is problematic for automaticity and indicates that semantic activation is not obligatory. Recently, however, Neely and Kahan (2001) concluded that the research of Besner and colleagues has not provided compelling evidence against automatic semantic activation. Specifically, Neely and Kahan suggested that focusing participants on only one letter in Besner et al.'s (1997; see also Besner & Stolz, 1999a , 1999b experiments may have degraded visual feature extraction and thus the manipulation may not be directly affecting semantic activation. Perhaps if the features of a stimulus (i.e., first stage of Biederman, 1987, and are not extracted, because of a narrow focus, then subsequent stages of processing including semantic activation are not activated. "The absence of priming or Stroop interference under that circumstance would tell us more about 'seeing' than about SA [semantic activation]" (Neely & Kahan, 2001, p. 73) . However, this potential limitation does not have any bearing on the data presented in this article, using this novel method. Participants in Experiments 2 and 3 did not change their focus from the entire word to part of the word-in all conditions participants focused on the entire word. Although the parafoveal visual complexity did increase when the objects were inserted into scenes, the amount of complexity was identical in the probable and improbable conditions. For example, the word pasta was categorized in a bedroom scene in all three conditions. The only difference was whether the word was surrounded by probable or improbable objects or nonobjects. Thus the elimination of interference for words inside improbable objects could not be due to a narrowing of attentional focus, because attention was concentrated on the same visual features as in the probable condition.
In conclusion, the interference paradigm introduced in Experiment 3 indicates that (a) the obtained interference effects in the probable and alone conditions resulted from the automatic activation of the semantic representation of the objects, and (b) the elimination of interference from improbable objects was not merely due to changes in attentional focus.
Conclusion
The experiments in this article were designed to address whether semantic activation of objects is automatic. Data from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest a positive answer. Interference was found for word categorization when those words were surrounded by an incongruent object, as compared with a neutral baseline. These results replicate, extend, and generalize earlier findings for objects tested in isolation. In Experiment 3, when this task was combined with probability violations within a scene, only probable objects continued to produce interference compared with the baseline. This finding suggests that the scene context influences the semantic access of objects, perhaps by blocking, slowing, or inhibiting their activation. This new paradigm, which eliminates guessing strategies and removes any intentional focus on the object, may prove to be useful in teasing apart the effects of scene context and the semantic activation of objects.
